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BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
After filing for bankruptcy, a subsidiary of Energy Future Holdings made payments and 
distributions to two groups of creditors. Now these creditors disagree about how to split up 
these assets. The 2011 creditors—who brought this case—rely on a contract to support 
their proposed allocation. But that contract applies only to collateral or proceeds of a sale 
of collateral conducted by the collateral agent.  
                                              




The payments and distributions here are neither. Payments and distributions made 
instead of collateral are not themselves collateral. And a bankruptcy court is not a collateral 
agent. So payments and distributions ordered by a bankruptcy court are not proceeds of a 
sale conducted by a collateral agent. We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The debts and the intercreditor agreement 
Energy Future Holdings is an electric company in Texas. Its subsidiary, Texas 
Competitive Electric Holdings Company LLC, owes money to two groups of creditors: one 
group with debt from 2007, and a second group with debt from 2011. The 2007 creditors’ 
debt had a lower interest rate than that of the 2011 creditors. The same collateral secures 
both groups’ debt. That collateral includes almost all the subsidiary’s assets. Neither group 
of creditors takes precedence over the other; their claims to the collateral have equal 
priority.  
An intercreditor agreement governs the relationship between the two groups of 
creditors. This agreement has a waterfall provision. A waterfall provision sets the order in 
which parties will receive benefits from an asset pool. Here, the provision describes how 
to distribute collateral if Energy Future’s subsidiary defaults on its debt. If the subsidiary 
defaults, and if the creditors must collect on the collateral or sell it to make themselves 
whole, then the waterfall provision is triggered. And according to the 2011 creditors, the 
provision gives them a greater share of the payments and distributions at issue.   
The waterfall provision does not govern every asset the creditors receive. It applies only 
to “[1] Collateral or [2] any proceeds thereof received in connection with the sale or other 
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disposition of, or collection on, such Collateral upon the exercise of remedies under the 
Security Documents by the Collateral Agent.” App. 196. The collateral agent is now 
Wilmington Trust. It can enforce the creditors’ claims on the collateral by, for instance, 
foreclosing on it, selling it, and distributing the profits to the creditors.  
B. The bankruptcy  
In April 2014, Energy Future and its subsidiary filed for bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, the 
subsidiary needed to use the collateral to keep running its business. But using the collateral 
risked depleting it. To protect against this risk, the bankruptcy court ordered the subsidiary 
to make monthly adequate-protection payments to the creditors. The subsidiary began 
making these payments about a month after filing for bankruptcy. 
More than two years later, the bankruptcy court approved the subsidiary’s bankruptcy 
plan. Before the court approved the plan, a majority of the 2007 and 2011 creditors voted 
for it. The plan explained in detail how the subsidiary would come out of bankruptcy 
without its past debt. It called for a corporate restructuring of the subsidiary, including 
several complex exchanges of its assets. All the assets the subsidiary owned as a result of 
the restructuring would be “free and clear of all Liens, Claims, charges, Interests, or other 
encumbrances.” App. 5387. 
As part of the plan, both the 2007 and 2011 creditors gave up any claims they had to 
the collateral. In exchange, the plan promised the creditors three types of plan distributions: 
(1) cash; (2) stock in a newly formed company; and (3) the right to receive tax benefits that 
the government owed the subsidiary.  
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The 2007 and 2011 creditors dispute how to split up both: (a) the adequate-protection 
payments and (b) the three types of plan distributions listed above. 
C. Procedural history 
Delaware Trust Company filed this lawsuit on behalf of the 2011 creditors. And three 
of the 2007 creditors—Morgan Stanley Capital Group, J. Aron & Company, and Titan 
Investment Holdings—intervened as defendants.  
The 2007 creditors moved for judgment on the pleadings. They argued that each 
creditor’s share of the payments and distributions should be based on what the subsidiary 
owed that creditor when the subsidiary went bankrupt. And bankruptcy law supports their 
argument. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (disallowing claims for post-bankruptcy interest). 
The 2011 creditors wanted a different allocation. They argued that, under the waterfall 
provision, each creditor’s share should be based on what the subsidiary would have owed 
that creditor when the subsidiary made the payments and distributions. This allocation 
would favor creditors with higher interest rates because it would include interest that 
accrued after the subsidiary filed for bankruptcy. Since the court did not approve the plan 
until more than two years after the bankruptcy filing, the parties estimate that this approach 
would allocate about $90 million more to the 2011 creditors.  
The bankruptcy court granted the 2007 creditors’ motion and dismissed Delaware 
Trust’s complaint. The District Court affirmed. Delaware Trust appeals this order on behalf 
of the 2011 creditors.  
To win, Delaware Trust must show both that the waterfall provision applies to these 
payments and distributions and that the waterfall provision allocates these assets in a 
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manner favorable to them. We need not reach the latter question because we hold that the 
waterfall provision does not apply here. 
D. Standard of review and governing law 
A defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings when, taking all the facts in the 
complaint as true, the plaintiff has no right to relief. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 249–
50 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, both parties agree on the facts. So this case depends on a legal 
issue: how to interpret the intercreditor agreement.  
We review a bankruptcy court’s interpretation of a contract de novo. In re: Energy 
Future Holdings Corp., 842 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2016). We interpret the intercreditor 
agreement under New York law because it has a New York choice-of-law provision. Id.; 
Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow, 45 N.E.3d 917, 919 (N.Y. 2015). Under 
New York law, we look to the text of the contract to determine the parties’ intent. 
Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002). So our reasoning 
depends on the particular wording before us.  
II. THE PAYMENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT COLLATERAL UNDER THE 
WATERFALL PROVISION 
The waterfall provision would apply to the adequate-protection payments and plan 
distributions if they were collateral. But they are not.  
The 2011 creditors argue that the payments and distributions are collateral because 
almost all of the subsidiary’s assets are collateral. They point to the definitions of collateral 
in the parties’ loan agreements and in one of the bankruptcy court’s orders.  
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But not every payment from the subsidiary’s assets is a payment of collateral. A 
payment of collateral reduces the amount of money owed on a debt. The subsidiary, 
however, made the adequate-protection payments in exchange for the creditors’ agreement 
to let the subsidiary use the collateral for other purposes. The adequate-protection payments 
did not decrease the amount of money the subsidiary owed on the debts. So, as the 
bankruptcy court correctly held, the adequate-protection payments are not payments of 
collateral. In re: Energy Future Holdings Corp., 546 B.R. 566, 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).  
And the plan distributions are made from assets on which the creditors had no liens. 
The plan specified that the creditors’ liens did not extend to any assets the subsidiary had 
because of the plan. The plan distributions were made from those assets. And bankruptcy 
law confirms that assets acquired after bankruptcy generally are “not subject to any lien 
resulting from” a prior agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). Thus, the plan distributions are not 
distributions of collateral. 
III. THE PAYMENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT PROCEEDS UNDER THE 
WATERFALL PROVISION 
The waterfall provision would also cover the payments and distributions if they were 
proceeds “received in connection with the sale or other disposition of, or collection on, 
such Collateral upon the exercise of remedies under the Security Documents by the 
Collateral Agent.” App. 196. This language imposes two requirements: First, the proceeds 
must be from a sale, collection, or disposition of collateral. Second, that sale, collection, or 
disposition must be part of a remedy implemented by the collateral agent (Wilmington 
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Trust). Neither the adequate-protection payments nor the plan distributions satisfy both 
requirements. 
The adequate-protection payments do not meet the first requirement. The 2011 creditors 
do not identify a sale, collection, or disposition of collateral that happened before those 
payments. Instead, the 2011 creditors argue that the payments are proceeds of the collateral 
because they were supposed to offset the collateral’s diminution in value. But this argument 
misses the point. Proceeds cannot be from a sale when there was no sale. So without a sale, 
collection, or disposition of the collateral, the adequate-protection payments cannot be 
proceeds under the waterfall provision.  
While the plan distributions might meet the first requirement (a sale or disposition), 
they do not meet the second (part of the collateral agent’s remedy). The 2011 creditors 
argue that the plan distributions are proceeds of the subsidiary’s corporate restructuring. 
They argue that the restructuring amounted to a sale or disposition of collateral. But even 
if it did, it was not part of a remedy implemented by the collateral agent.  
The 2011 creditors claim that the collateral agent’s participation in the bankruptcy 
counts as a remedy. But even if the collateral agent’s actions in the bankruptcy were a 
remedy, the restructuring was not a part of this remedy. The creditors, not the collateral 
agent, voted for the restructuring. And the bankruptcy court approved it. This corporate 
restructuring, blessed by the bankruptcy court, is a far cry from a collateral agent’s typical 
remedy: selling the collateral at a foreclosure sale. Because the restructuring was not a 
remedy implemented by the collateral agent, the plan distributions are not proceeds under 
the waterfall provision. 
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* * * * * 
Because the payments and distributions are neither collateral nor proceeds under the 
waterfall provision, the provision does not apply. So each creditor is entitled to payments 
and distributions based on what the subsidiary owed it when the subsidiary filed for 
bankruptcy. We will thus affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 
